This is all very well analysed, Sam, and I agree with your diagnosis. I offer just a thought: What would you do if you were able to decide yourself on NATO’s response? Would you put an army into Ukraine? Would you attack Russian positions in Ukraine? Would you believe with sufficient certainty (you decide) that Russia won’t attach NATO? You break it, you own it. Hence I believe it is not an unreasonable strategy to see if there is a level of support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia that is sufficient to prevent Russia from winning but a good way short of provoking a direct war between NATO and Russian, however uncomfortable that may be. It does leave open the question what to do when this strategy is about to fail.
Hey Konrad! Good to see you on here. Thanks for reading, and for a very good question. I agree that NATO has big problems, the greatest of which is coordinating a response across a range of members of the coalition with very different perspectives and priorities. But from a negotiation strategy point of view, I think the best strategy is extremely simple and clear:
1) Financially: by analogy with Central Banks in a crisis, NATO members should undertake without caveat to provide "whatever it takes" in terms of financial support for Ukraine to repel the invasion. And as an immediate measure to communicate the seriousness of this statement, double all financial commitments to Ukraine with immediate effect. (This is a trivial cost, since annual Western support to Ukraine is <0.1% of GDP so far.)
2) Militarily: NATO should say that all decisions on how to spend the money are up to Ukraine. It can choose what weapons to buy and how to use them. Ukraine is not asking for NATO troops on Ukraine soil. The remarkable Ukrainian army is probably much more effective and experienced on the front line than any foreign NATO headcount. But it lacks the resources needed to gain the upper hand and the support it has received so far has come with arbitrary restrictions, e.g. on how certain weapons can be used, which should now be lifted. Russia crossed the border to attack Ukraine. Ukraine should be able to cross the border to defend itself.
3) Strategically: NATO should state without caveat that the goal in supporting Ukraine is to repel the Russian invasion and restore the previously recognised international borders, including Crimea, and that financial support will continue at a level allowing Ukraine to achieve that goal quickly and rapidly to minimise casualties over time. Once borders are restored Ukraine should be welcomed into NATO and into the EU. (Of course, any of these objectives, including Crimea and/or NATO membership, could be compromised later on as part of a peace agreement, but only the true Narrenschiffers would offer those kinds of compromise before serious talks begin).
Overall the point is that Western support for Ukraine under the Biden model was an incredibly good deal for the West. For <0.1% of GDP and <5% of military budgets, and with no NATO troops on the ground, and without any NATO offensive moves or aggression, it looked like Russia would be roundly defeated and long term security risks materially reduced. The world would have seen the Russian collapse as self-inflicted, there would have been gains for the world order from this outcome. But since the change in US government, this outlook has evidently changed.
This is all very well analysed, Sam, and I agree with your diagnosis. I offer just a thought: What would you do if you were able to decide yourself on NATO’s response? Would you put an army into Ukraine? Would you attack Russian positions in Ukraine? Would you believe with sufficient certainty (you decide) that Russia won’t attach NATO? You break it, you own it. Hence I believe it is not an unreasonable strategy to see if there is a level of support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia that is sufficient to prevent Russia from winning but a good way short of provoking a direct war between NATO and Russian, however uncomfortable that may be. It does leave open the question what to do when this strategy is about to fail.
Hey Konrad! Good to see you on here. Thanks for reading, and for a very good question. I agree that NATO has big problems, the greatest of which is coordinating a response across a range of members of the coalition with very different perspectives and priorities. But from a negotiation strategy point of view, I think the best strategy is extremely simple and clear:
1) Financially: by analogy with Central Banks in a crisis, NATO members should undertake without caveat to provide "whatever it takes" in terms of financial support for Ukraine to repel the invasion. And as an immediate measure to communicate the seriousness of this statement, double all financial commitments to Ukraine with immediate effect. (This is a trivial cost, since annual Western support to Ukraine is <0.1% of GDP so far.)
2) Militarily: NATO should say that all decisions on how to spend the money are up to Ukraine. It can choose what weapons to buy and how to use them. Ukraine is not asking for NATO troops on Ukraine soil. The remarkable Ukrainian army is probably much more effective and experienced on the front line than any foreign NATO headcount. But it lacks the resources needed to gain the upper hand and the support it has received so far has come with arbitrary restrictions, e.g. on how certain weapons can be used, which should now be lifted. Russia crossed the border to attack Ukraine. Ukraine should be able to cross the border to defend itself.
3) Strategically: NATO should state without caveat that the goal in supporting Ukraine is to repel the Russian invasion and restore the previously recognised international borders, including Crimea, and that financial support will continue at a level allowing Ukraine to achieve that goal quickly and rapidly to minimise casualties over time. Once borders are restored Ukraine should be welcomed into NATO and into the EU. (Of course, any of these objectives, including Crimea and/or NATO membership, could be compromised later on as part of a peace agreement, but only the true Narrenschiffers would offer those kinds of compromise before serious talks begin).
Overall the point is that Western support for Ukraine under the Biden model was an incredibly good deal for the West. For <0.1% of GDP and <5% of military budgets, and with no NATO troops on the ground, and without any NATO offensive moves or aggression, it looked like Russia would be roundly defeated and long term security risks materially reduced. The world would have seen the Russian collapse as self-inflicted, there would have been gains for the world order from this outcome. But since the change in US government, this outlook has evidently changed.
This is worth reading on the same topic:
https://cepa.org/article/its-still-costing-peanuts-for-the-us-to-defeat-russia/